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According to Rodney Davenport, in the Oxford History of South Africa, 'the
rule of law did not exist at the Cape in the Company period'.1 This statement
secms incredible in view of the immense volume of the survivmg legal
archives—a volume of the criminal court cases for a single year can easily be
over 1000 paees of manuscript2—and the large number of placcaaten issucd
by the povernment of the Cape of Good Hope in the eightcenth Century.-1
This, so" it would seem, is evidence of a society in which the Roman-Dutch
law of the Republic of the Netherlands, as amcnded first to suit the require-
ments of an castern trading empire and then of the port and colony of the
Cape, was used to settlc disputes and to maintain public order and the rights
of property. South Africa was clearly rulcd by a code of law—as indeed is
probably every society in the world, in some sense or other—and moreover
by one which was based on a system to which more concentrated legal
thought had been given, at a higher theoretical level, than any other m the
seventcenth and eighteenth centurics. To be sure, there were no junsts of any
standing whatsoever at the Cape at the time. Most of the meinbers of the
Court of Justicc had. no legal training at all.' Ncverthcless, the codifications
and tcxtbooks which they used were among the finest products of the greatest
pcriocl of Dutch intcllcctual history. Tt is doubtful if the 'modernity' of the
legal system of any other country could be comparcd with that of the Nclher-
lands in the eightcenth Century. Certainly that of the Netherlands could be
comparcd with that of any other country.
The batllement which Davcnport's init ial sentencc presents is, to a certam
extent eascd by the rest of the paragraph in question, whcrc hè imphcitly
defines 'the rule of law' as one where the law was imposed 'uniformly' and
'fully impartialfly]', so that the 'sevcrity of the sentcnccs [did nol] depend .; .
largely on the lenal status of the offender or the person olTcnded agamstV
That the contrary was the case was clearly admitted by the Dutch authonties.
When, after the British capture of the Cape in 1795, the Court of Justicc was
informed that the barbaric nature of the capital punishment imposed m
Company t i mes was hcnccforth to be mitigatcd, so that slaves would mercly
be hanged or bcheadcd, they replied as follows:
With reeard to slaves . . . the equality of punisliinent ceases whcn they
commit'olTences against Europeans or frce persons, particularly their
masters; but this clistinction is no« peculiar to this country; on the
contrary it is groundcd upon analogy with the criminal law, according
to which the clistinction of persons is one of the essential points by which
the dcgree of punishment is measured in most civilised nations, and this
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distinction is espccially founded upon the Imperial laws or the Roman
law, which from its exactness is not only acknowledged as the law when
other laws are silent, but is particularly recommended as such in the
Statutes which have been issued in the Dutch Indies relative to slaves, and
are observed heren.
To a modern western liberal, for whom equality, above all bcfore the law, is
a cardinal necessity for just government, these words may be anathema.
Nevertheless, the general acceptance of liberal views by Europeans came
only after the French Revolution. When these words were written, it was at its
height, but its effects had only reached South Africa in the form of a conquer-
ing English fleet, rather than as an ideology. Before that time, the principles
were different. The ruling ethos of European society was not equality but
hierarchy, and the task of the courts of law, inter alia, was to maintain this
nccessary Subordination of underlings and superiority of rrtasters. The British,
it should be noted, did not object to differential sentencing, but only to the
barbarity of breaking slaves alive on a cross. Given the way in which the
courts were used by the British ruling class to enforce deference, the new
rulers of the Cape could hardly object to the way in which the Dutch had
used the law to maintain the necessary distinctions of status between master
and slave.7
Because the law was used to maintain the social structure of the Cape
Colony, even if often in a fairly violent and brutal way, the slave population
was not completely without legal rights. Although the effect of the Dutch
experience in Indonesia in forming their attitudes to such matters must not
be ignored, what position the Cape slaves possessed was duc largely to the
conflict between the Company and the burghers, which was always latent and
occasionally explicit.8 This conflict was based on two oppositions. First, the
Company officials considered that the burghers acted as competitors in their
(illegal) private trade and were, indeed, always likely to cause trouble with the
officials of the V.O.C, in the Netherlands. Conversely, the burghers rescnted
the restrictions which the Company monopolies of buying and selling placed
on their actions and on the profïtability of their farms and business. This
conflict became focussed on the law courts, and thus on the legal status of
the slaves, just because this was one arena in which the authority of the
Company was imposed on the burghers. The presence of two members of the
Burghcr Council on the Court (except when employees of the Company were
on trial) did little to mitigate the control of the officials over the adminis-
tration of justice. No Separation of powers between judiciary, legislature and
administration existed at the Cape. All was concentrated in a very few hands.
It is true that the Company itself ovvned some 600 slaves throughout the
eightcenth Century, while the high officials of government were themselves in
possession of numerous slaves. While they did not allow these slaves to take
any liberties, they did not sec their own slaves as great a threat to their
hegemony as the competition they feared from the burghers. Indeed, there
are slight indications that they were somcwhat loath to punish their own
slaves as harshly as they did those belonging to private citizens. They did not
wish to lose fhcir labour force, but could willingly impose such a loss on
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others, in the name of the public good. Thus, as a class, the main body of
slave-owners was remarkably powerless. In most European colonies which
relied on slavc labour, the great planters had, at the least, great influence
over the conduct of government in all its actions. At the Cape their sway did
not reach the main institutions of legislation and justice. This meant that
the position of the slave with regard to his master was stronger than in many
other slave colonies. For as long as the Company maintained its hegemony
over the Colony, the balance of power gave the slaves (and the Khoi)9 a
certain bargaining power that they lost, I would argue, with the collapse of
the Company at the end of the eighteenth Century.1 V
This strengthened legal position can be shown best in the opportunities
which slaves had to make complaints against their owners and to givc
evidence against them. It does not seem that the Court of Justice treated the
evidence of a slave as any more or less trustworthy than that of a white man,
even including his inaster. This remarkable competence seems to have been
brought to the Cape, like so much else in terms of legal Organisation, from
Batavia. In the original Statuten van India of 1642, it was laid down that:
Whenever they have been treated mercilessly by their masters or mis-
tresses, slaves are allowed to complain to the judge, provided they have
good and cogent reasons, otherwise [they] will be flogged and sent back
home.11
At the Cape, and very likely further east as well, this rule was interpreted
widely. Slaves might not only complain of their own treatment but also might
report the harsh punishment meted out to their fellow bondsmen. Indeed the
largest proportion of cases instigated by slaves against their masters came
when it was reported that the master had brought about the death of one of
his slaves, generally as a result of overpunishment.12 A typical case occurred
in 1732, when Jan Crugel, a farmer from the Joostenberg in Stellenbosch
district, was accused of flogging his slave Maarten so severely that hè died.
The only witnesses to the cvcnt—at least the only ones who were prepared to
talk—wcre Maarten's fellow slaves. They testified that, some time previously,
Maarten had run away, only to be captured two or three days later by a
shepherd. Crugel had ordcred him to spend the night chained to a waggon
and thcn had him tied in a 'poolse bok' (a form of rack) and flogged with a
sjambok, the hippopotamus hide whip that has remained the symbol of
white baasskap in South Africa. After this treatment he ran away again, was
again caught two days later, was thrown onto the threshing floor of the farm
and flogged once more. This time the punishment proved too severe and hè
died a short time later. However, his fellow slaves did not complain immedi-
ately, as it took them a while to pluck up the courage to visit the landdrost
(magistrale) of Stellenbosch. As a consequence, by the time the surgeon came
to invcstigate the causc of the death, hè could only state that the medical
evidence seemed to confirm the testimony of the slaves. Despite this degree of
uncertainty, Crugel was convicted and fined 100 Rijksdaalders, while the
court ordered that those slaves who had given evidence against him be sold
out of his possession, or that of any of his family.13
In many ways, this case was a classic example of Cape justice working,
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somewhat belatedly, for the proteetion of the slave population. The central
governmcnt reserved the right of punishmcnt, even of slaves, to itsclf, at least
when what was deserved excceded ordinary domestic chastisement. Indeed,
the procedure secms to have been quite regulär and the surrt paid in fines by a
convicted inaster was constant (and low, a quartcr ofthat demanded of thosc
who broke the liquor laws). Indeed, it was not necessary for the slave to die
for the same laws to be brought into Operation. For instance, in 1768, Pieter
Casper Hammes was fined the normal amount of 100 Rijksdaalders for
knocking out his slave, September van Bougis, with an iron hamrner. Sep-
tember had been doing bad work in the forge (hat Hammes ran, and answer-
ing him back, annoying him so much that hè was driven to smack the hammer
hè was using into the back of Septembcr's heacl. Rather surprisingly,
September survived and, when hè came to, complaincd to the Fiscaal.11 In
addition to these occasional bursts of temper, which might nevertheless have
disastrous consequenccs for the slaves, really persistent mishandling could be
punished more scvercly. In 1767, for instance, Jan Hendrick Gerhard was
banned from the Cape Colony for lifc for persistent violence towards his
slaves.15 This seems to have been an isolatcd case, which shows the l imit
bcyond which the Court of Justice would not go in disciplining the more
unruly members of the white population. Judicially, the d.eath of a slave was
always causcd by 'mishandling' and cxccssive punishmcnt—at any rate when
caused by a frec man—and was never murdcr. A masler might fear financial
consequences from laying into his slaves too hard, but certainly never capital
ones.
In view of the lenicncy with which assaults on slaves were generally trcatcd
by the Cape Court of Justice, it might be argued that it gave slaves no
effective proteetion against their mastcrs. To a certain extent, this is truc. The
fear of punishmcnt can never have been u detcrrent to the actions of the
slaveowners. The major advantage that slaves gained from the law derived
from the fact that thosc slaves who witncssed against their masters (including
all those who had been the victims of assaults) had to bc sok) to another,
hopefully more humane, owner, if their charges werc not malicieus. Clcarly,
this could be a real advantage, and thus access to the law, which is what the
right to tcstify entailcd, was a real privilege. It is instructivc to compare fjust
for oncc) the Cape with the southeni United States of America in this respect.
In the U.S., Opposition to the possibility of a black giving cvidcnce against
whites was so great that, to quote Genovcsc:
In Louisiana in 1840 the ultimate irony occurrcd, when a white man who
had incited slaves to insurrection had to be acquiltcd becausc their
confessions could not be used against him. 1 0
Even the Spanish law code of the late middle ages, which is renowned as
recognizing the pcrsonality of the bondsman, only allowed the slave to
accuse his master of specific, vcry scriotis offences, such as treason or murder-
ing his wife.17 This contrasts grcatly witl i the calm assurance of the Cape
Fiscaal when hè was asked if it was normal for slaves to make eomplaints
against their mastcrs and if thcy had the competence to do so. Daniel van de
Hengel claimed that:
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This had happened many timcs, and no-onc was unavvare that slaves are
often ill-trcated by thcir masters, in which case they are just as much
cntitled to complain as are their masters in the opposite case. As that is
the position hcre, he has nothing more to say in the matter.18
Two years earlier, in fact, the Fiscaal had argucd that if the testimony of
slaves and Khoisan was not acceptcd against 'so-callcd Christian belicvers,
then in the interior of the country away from the Cape the law would not be
able to operatc'.10 Clearly, for the Company to keep control over its unruly,
uoprofitable and thinly scttlcd colony, it needed all the help it could gct, even
when that came from slaves.
In general, of course, the control had to be cxcrciscd against slaves. The
Company officials were concerned to keep control over the colony and so
wcre occasionally forced to ally with individual slaves against owncrs, but in
general the interests of the V.O.C., and thus of the members of the Court of
Justice, tended to coincide with those of the slave owners. After all, it was
the slave owners who were responsiblc for producing the goods on which the
Company relied to provision its ships- -even if the actual labour was mainly
slave. In addition, all social, religieus and national ties linkcd the Company
officials, who were p.ftcr all gcnerally slave-holders themselves, to at least the
more substantial of the burgTicrs. Moreover, the only real threat to the colony
could come from slaves. The burghers might from time to time complain
about the commercial policy that deprived t hem of many business oppor-
tunities, and often left them rather poor, but there would ncver be any serious
attempt to ovcrthrow the rule of the V.O.C. Nor, except for frequent dis-
turbances and stabbings outside Cape Town's pubs—which were in any case
generally the doing of sailors—did whites tcnd to disturb the peace of the
colony. To a certaïn cxtent, the major trouble that they caused the Court of
Justice came from infringemcnts against the various economie regulations
that the Company had dccided to impose. Of these, the limitations on the sale
of alcoholic beverage, above all wine and brandy, were the most notable.
With the slaves, of course, it was different. It must be admitted that there was
never any Suggestion of a slave revolt wi th sufficient momentum to challengc
the bases of white power. Only for a few years in the late 1730s was there even
any suggestion of panic, espccially after a group of runaways had nearly
succecded in thcir at tempt to set fire to Cape Town.20 Rather it was at the
level of the individual farm and household that the slaves prcsented a constant
danger to their masters.
Almost all the cases relating to slaves and coming beforc the Court of
Justice were construed as crimes against the persons of their masters, of other
slaves, or against property. In the commercial mercenary world of a great
mcrchant Company, property clearly had to be protected, but attacks on the
authority of the slave owner were fa r more serious than this. They rcpresented
a challengc to the very principle of hierarchy by which the society was
organised. Although, for the purpose of maintaining their own control—and
perhaps in accordance with the castcrn code of behaviour that their prede-
cessors had adapted in Java- -the V.O.C, officials allowed slaves rather more
rights than might be expccted by a historian whose experience was limited to
the New World, the administration of the Cape, as reprcscnted by the Court
10 THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
of Justice, clearly saw the maintenance of the proper order of society as one
of its most important tasks.
The reservation to itself of punishment of slaves did not imply that the
government of the Cape was indifferent to their conduct towards their
masters, nor that it considered that the masters should have no say in the
disciplining of the slave population. It did not require the breach of one of
the numerous regulations limiting the actions of the slaves before corporal
punishment, often of a savage kind, was inflicted on an unfortunate bonds-
man. Rather, slaves who had in some way or other given their masters cause
to wish them chastised were sent to the 'Gaffers' andtfiogged. These, men,
who were generally convicts themselves, banned frorrr hè East Indies to the
Cape, doubled as executioner's assistants. In general, they seem to have acted
upon the orders of the Fiscaal, or, in the country district, of the landdrosts,ïl
but the Fiscaal seems generally to have agreed to requests that slaves be
punished by his officers for what seem relatively minor offences.2'- In 1763,
for instance, February van Bataria was frequently sent to the Caffers by his
master, Christiaan Daniel Persoon, because his daily peddling of cake in the
streets of Cape Town did not bring in enough money.23 What the practice
meant was, first, that the Cape government retained some sort of control
over the exercisc of violence and, secondly, that it could mitigate the severity
of the punishment. In these aims, admittedly, it was not very successful, as
the dividing line between what was reasonable domestic correction and what
was an abrogation of the monopoly of force belonging to the Company
authorities was very hazy indeed. A slave owner might alvvays plead that hè
had sufllcicnt reason for ovcrstepping the limits, and this might very well
be accepted, as when Robert Schot, a Free Black from Bengal, argued success-
fully that only by chaining his slaves, in itself an illegal act, could hè makc
sure that they did not escape on their way to Cape Town where hè was
sending them to have the Fiscaal punish them.24 Rather, the Company seems
above all to have been rescrving its right to be the maintaincr of the hierarchy
by which the Cape was governed.
The varieties of control that the Company attempted to impose are perhaps
best seen from the codification of the slave regulations issued in 1754.25 It is
therefore worth devoting a certain amount of attention to the twenty-nine
provisions of this placaat, even though all it did was to re-issue various
previously promulgatcd ordinances, in no particularly logical order. The
rules may be classified into five main divisions. First, there were those which
referred simply to the daily life of the slaves and were evidently not attempts
to obviate a threat to the bases of Cape society. Some were clearly mcasures
for the better government of Cape Town, such as traffic regulations (to be
anachronistic) and the rules for the disposal of rubbish. Others, notably
attempts to forbid the public houses of Cape Town to slaves or to outlaw
gambling—both futile undertakings—may have stemmed from a desire to
keep the slaves rather better under control, to prevent scditious conversation
or to remove one of the temptations for theft. Finally there was a group of
edicts which referred clearly to the more ritual aspects and their maintenance
among the Cape slaves. The prohibition of smoking pipes in the streets might
be explained as an attempt to reduce the danger of fire spreading to the low-
THE RULE OF LAW H
hanging thatched roofs of the town, and it was clearly preferable for a society
which prided itself on its Christianity that slaves should not harrass the
congregation as it left the church. On the other hand, there could be no
clearer example of the hierarchy, not only between whites and slaves but
within the white community, than the regulation that laid down that only
'six, eight or at the most ten slaves, according to the rank of the dead slave's
master' might follow the cortège and assist at a slave funeral.
Secondly, there was that category of offences which related to the harbour-
ing of slaves by free men other than their master. To a certain extent these
had an economie function. Employing another man's slave was, after all,
tantamount to stealing a fraction of his labour power from the rightful
owner of that commodity. Nevertheless, there was always the suspicion that
such concealment was for the much more serious purpose of helping a slave
to run away. Aiding a slave to escape was thus to be considered as theft, and
punished accordingly, while putting another man's slave to work was merely
considered worthy of a fine of 100 Rijksdaalders, although the slave himself
was also to be summarily flogged.
Thirdly, there were those regulations which related more or less explicitly
to the prevention of theft by slaves. The problem that the government had to
face was that it was clearly very difficult to control pilfering and house-
breaking, above all in Cape Town. Therefore they considered that the only
efficiënt way to do this, in addition to normal detective work (in itself very
rudimentary) was to outlaw the selling of potentially stolen goods. For this
reason it was laid down that no-one was either to let his slaves seil any goods
on the street (except foodstuffs, for which the normal retailers were peddling
slaves, especially with regard to cakes and vegetables) or to buy from them.
Each of these offences would bring a fine of 50 Rijksdaalders. In addition, if
anyone bought goods from a slave at a price below the going rate, or in any
other way gave rise to the suspicion that they had been stolen, hè was to be
punished as a receiver of stolen goods.
Fourthly, there were those rules whose essential purpose was to prevent
the possibility of revolt, or to prevent slaves from gathering together to plot.
Thus, the officers of justice in Cape Town, both Gaffers and the burgerwagt,
were ordered to break up, by use of canes, any meeting of thrce or more
slaves of different masters on the streets of Cape Town. At times, the court
went even further than this to stop potentially dangerous gatherings. About
midnight one March evening in 1736, at the height of the panic about slave
behaviour, the hurgerwagt caught six slaves sitting together in a garden
hut on the lower slopes of Table Mountain on the cdge of Cape Town. They
were playing dice, apparently, and a pot of rice, one of meat curry and a
bottle of arak—which had probably been stolen from their respective masters
—stood by them. For this offence, they were each sentcnced to be flogged
and to wear chains for a year. The reasons that were given were that they
could steal from the gardens, plot together and establish contact with the
runaways on Table Mountain. In addition, they had candles burning, which
could have led to a fire.2" At times, clearly, the government considered it of
paramount importance to keep the slave population atomised, although they
cannot be said to have had any degree of success in this end.
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As a similar measure, no slave was ever to be allovved to carry a firearrn,
even when herding cattlc, a hazardous business in a country vvhere wild
animals of the more dangerous sorts still existcd. Again, in an attcmpt to
prevent nefarious activities of night-time Cape Tovvn, all slaves were forced
to carry a lantern if they were about thc strccts after ten in thc evening,
unless thcy should be accompanying their master or his family.
Fifthly, but perhaps most importantly, were those placaaten which ordered
the relations between a slave and his master, or bctween a slave and another
European. It is notcworthy that these includcd the first two articles of R i jk
Tulbagh's codification. They said quitc simply:
That a male or fcmale slave who Insults, libcls, scorns, calumnies or in
any way falsely accuses his master or mistress shall bc flogged and
chaincd, or punished in some othcr way according to the nature of the
case.
But should in these matters a male or female slave offend to such an
extent that hè comcs to strike his master or mistress, wi th or without a
weapon, hè shall bc punishcd with death without mercy.
As wil l be shown bclow, slaves werc frequently executcd for str iking their
masters. Libel could also be severely treated. In 1762, April van Bengal, a
fifty-year-old slave of the immcnsely rieh burghcr, Märten Melck, was
sentenced to stand undcr thc gallows with a rope round his neck, be flogged,
branded and then chaincd to a wheclbarrow for life and sent to prison on
Robben Island. His ofTence, with a fellow countryman, January, who was to
bc sold out of South Africa aftcr being flogged and branded, was to have
spread the rumour, svhich turncd out to be untruc, that Melck had got his
stcp-daughter with child and then beatcn her so that she miscarried.27
At the same time, the governmcnt ordcrcd that any slave who jostled or
othersvisc insultcd any European 'of no matter how mean quality ' would bc
flogged by thc ollicers of justice, unless the slave's master had been present,
in which case he was obligcd to punish his erring slave.
These laws were backed u p by a code of punishment which, to thc twcntieth-
century historian, sccms barbaric in thc extreme. To a ccrtain extent this
derived from the nature of slavery as an Insti tution. Fines were simply not
practical, as legally a slave could not possess propcrty. Similarly, imprison-
ment hit thc master linancially without greatly altering thc position of the
slave, who could not suffer from being deprivcd of a libcrty he did not possess.
Only the Company gaincd from thc ava i lab i l i ty of extra man-power, but even
this was not very useful as the limc-works on Robben Island were of relatively
litt le importance for the cconomy of the colony. Punishment for a slave could
thcrefore only be corporal, or, of coursc, capital.28
The lowest level of punishment was thcrefore flogging, which was often
coupled with putting the unfortunate slave in chains and then sending h i m
back to his master to work chaincd tor a numbcr of years. For somewhat
more serious oflcnccs, slavcs were also branded, and might indeed be put on
Robben Island, very often also in chains. Howevcr, the System of legal terror
by which thc authoritics tricd to mainlain order over the subject population
rcsted primarily on capital punishment. All offences against the person of a
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slave's master, all murders, whether against free man or slave, and many
thefts were punished by death. It might be thought that this did not allow
any gradation in treatment, but this was not so. Dutch law allowed criminals
to be executed in numerous different ways. Depending on the severity of the
ofience, the condemned man died more or less slowiy and painfully, and at the
Cape these distinctions wcre ordered in an umvritten but regulär patter».
Certain methods of death were reserved for those found guilty of particular
crimes. Thus, arsonists were burnt and those convicted of homosexuality or
bestiality were drowncd, generally tied to their co-respondent. But, for the
rest, there was a regulär progression of increasing torture which accompanied
death. For instancc, in the 1760s the more serious varieties of theft, in
particular those where the culprit seems to have been organising a gang, the
murder of one slave by another, where no other offence seems to have been
committed, raising a hand against a master, and minor participation in what
was seen as the plotting of a revolt, were all punished by hanging. Murdering
fellow slaves, when this offence was aggravated by other crimes, such as rape
°r theft, was generally punished by breaking on a cross. Sometimes, the
sufferer was put out of his misery by a coup de grace, but frequently hè or she
was left to die of the pain of hanging from broken limbs. For particularly
serious offences, such as mercenary murder, Icading the plot for murdering a
white man, even this was not enough. Red-hot tongs would be used to pull
°ut eight pieces of flesh before the unfortunate man was broken. Earlier in the
Century, the murder of a master by his own slave was punished by sitting the
culprit on an iron spike which penetrated up from his anus into his body.
Depending on the weather, hè took up to two days to die."9
As the purpose of this barbarity was not only justice but also deterrent, all
these punishments were carried out in public, generally at a regulär spot,
although those vvho looted wrccked ships were hanged summarily on the
beach. Morcover, so that everyone would have a constant reminder of the
consequences of their actions, the corpse of the executed would be left, as the
fonnula had it, 'until the birds and wind dcstroy it'. Thus the execution place,
on the edge of Cape Town, approximately where the central railway station
now stands, would generally be adorned with rotting bodies.
As a back-up to the vicious system of punishments, torture was used to
extract confcssions. This was thought necessary because the Romaii-Dutch
law insisted that anyone who was to bc executed should first admit his or her
guilt. This treatment was not reserved for slaves, as it might also be imposed
on free men, especially sailors. Tn fact, relatively few suspects were actually
seut to the torture chamber, and once thcre the sight of the instruments was
frequently enough to produce the requircd statement. Ncvertheless, the degree
to which the whole system was based on the knowledge among the population
that torture would be used to extract confessions can be seen from the adjust-
ment in the rules of court procedure that the British were forced to introducé
after they conquered the Cape in 1795. Because they considered torture to be
mhuman, they abolished its use, but soon found that about half the murderers
were not being executed, since they realised that this could not be done
without a confession, and therefore that they only had to rcmain resolute
under questioning for the court to be forced merely to sentence them to
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prison. Since this did not seem to the British authorities to meet the require-
ments of justice, they had to alter the conditions for conviction and execution,
so that it was no longer necessary for the culprit to confess. The normal rules
of judicial proof had to be considered sufficient.30
Clearly, the efficiency of the judicial terror with which the government
attempted to control the colony and to maintain the social order depended
on the quality of its police and detective work. This was notably lacking. In
Cape Town, the Gaffers and the burgerwagt, a sort of police militia,31 patrolled
the streets, but their chance of catching criminals in the act must have been
slight. Where crimes were committed within a houschold, there must have
been a reasonable chance of identifying the guilty party, but more organised
theft can only have been detected by the tracing of stolen goods. This seems
to have been a fairly rare occurrence, especially as the Chinese community
acted as the normal receivers and was particularly difficult to penetrate.32 In
addition, sailors on the numerous ships were always available to take goods
out of the country. However, in the absence of statistical data on the number
of crimes committed, it is impossible to give any indication of just how
unsuccessful the authorities were.
In the countryside the problem was rather different. Although some of the
crimes were the work of slaves who remained with their masters,33 the most
serious problem came from slaves who ran away. To counteract these, the
burghers had to rely on their own strcngth, as Company forces rarely pene-
trated across the Cape flats. Thus the commando system, which was a militia
force also used against the Khoisan, was employed, above all against large
groups. It was not particularly successful. At the end of the Century, Lichten-
stein wrote that, in the mountains betvveen modern Wolseley and Ceres:
A thousand places of concealment offer the wished for asylums to slaves
deserting [the farmers'] service and bands of these robbers not in-
frequcntly take advantage of the favourable nature of the spot to harbour
in it for a long time together, living on the plunder of the neighbouring
flocks and herds, gardens and fields. From time immemorial, this
mountain has never been free from marauders, notwithstanding that
parties have frcquently been sent against thcm, and numbers have been
brought to justice. Some half-instructed travellers have confounded these
people with the Bosjesmans; but they have no relation whatever with
them. They are much less addicted to murder; but are not so easily
taken, on account of the firearms which they have for defending them-
serves.34
Clearly, then, the law could not be imposed on all criminals—as the courts
defined them—but then no society in the world has ever had a police system
of that efficiency. Given the vast distances in the countryside and the nature
of the society in the port city of Cape Town, the authorities probably did
worse than they would have done in contemporary Europc. Certainly, they
had few funds at their disposal, and their net of agents was too widely spread
to be very efiective. However, no system of government has ever been able to
apprehend all those it 'wished to question', let alone know who committed
every crime which comes to their attention. There have always been differences
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m the degree to which they could penetrate the various strata of the societies
off ? ed to rule' while the personal power and social status of the
bod" C invariably tended to influence the attitudes of sentencing
f a i r ' e legal system of the Cape of Good Hope was not uniciue in itsings, nor were they particularly extreme. lts task was to maintain the
pre-emmence of the V.O.C, within a general system of social stratification.
oo many of the inhabitants of the Cape had all too good cause to regret its
success m achieving these ends.
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